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Abstract

User Habituation in Keystroke Dynamics Based Authentication

Abstract

Qi Cheng
Most computer systems use usernames and passwords for authentication
and access control. For long, password security has been framed as a
tradeoff between user experience and password security. Trading off one
for the other appears to be an inevitable dilemma for single password
based security applications. As a new biometric for authenticating access,
keystroke dynamics offers great promises in hardening the password
mechanism. Our research first investigate the keystroke dynamics based
password security by conducting an incremental study on user’s
habituation process for keystroke dynamics analysis using two distinct
types of passwords. The study shows that 1) long and complex passwords
are more efficient to be employed in keystroke dynamics systems; and 2)
there is a habituation and acclimation process before the user obtains a
stable keystroke pattern and the system collects enough training data.
Then, based on our findings, we propose a two passwords mechanism
that attempts to strike the right balance over user experience and
password security by adopting a conventional easy-to-memorize
password followed by a long-and-complex phrase for keystroke dynamics
verification. Analysis and experimental studies successfully demonstrate
the effectiveness of our proposed approach.
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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Motivation
In modern society, the username/password scheme is widely used to
control access to a resource. Especially in computer networking and
related fields, users may require passwords for many purposes: logging in
to computer accounts, retrieving email from servers, accessing databases,
etc. Once the password is stolen, the intruder will have access to the
private data and have full set of rights of the authorized user. To reduce
the risk of lost confidentiality and integrity, an effective password protect
scheme is required.
Keystroke dynamics, which is a new biometric technology, has been
developed to enhance the security of username/password verification
scheme. Keystroke dynamics, also referred to as typing rhythms, is
behavioral in nature. User’s habituation has been shown in the process of
forming his/her unique typing pattern. However, there is no deep analysis
of user’s typing habituation in the current studies of keystroke dynamics.
A study of user’s habitation, which is the topic of our research, will be
helpful for building a reliable keystroke dynamic system.
Another concern, also the subject of our research, is that the security is
increased with a consequent loss of convenience for users using
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username/password verification. A balance between security and
convenience should be found in the deployment of keystroke dynamic
system.
1.2 Goal
Based on previous work, the goal of this study is to provide evidence of
user habituation in keystrokes while typing passwords. As the password
protecting policy of keystroke dynamics system is different from that of
traditional password verification system, another goal of the study is to
analyze their differences and evaluate the application potential of
keystroke dynamic systems.
1.3 Contribution
An incremental learning experiment described in this thesis provides
evidence of user habituation when they type two kinds of passwords:
short common English words and long random character string with shiftkey behavior.
The study also discusses the vulnerabilities of long passwords and short
passwords. Considering the characteristics of traditional password system
and the requirements of keystroke dynamics system, our study introduces
a two-password mechanism which takes advantage of both, and finds a
balance between security and convenience.
1.4 Organization
The thesis consists of 6 chapters. Chapter 2 is a literature review of user
authentication systems, performance measures used in our study, and
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selected data mining algorithms. Chapter 3 gives an overview of
password security systems and keystroke related studies and describes the
experimental design in our previous research and discusses the
experimental results. Chapter 4 focuses on the results of incremental
learning experiments and the system using Random Forest for matching /
classification while also providing trend lines of the performance.
Chapter 5 offers considerations and limitations of traditional password
systems, and then presents a way to combine keystroke dynamics with it
to improve password security. Finally, Chapter 6 provides the
conclusions and discusses the ways to further optimize achieved
performance.
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Chapter 2 Literature Review

2.1 Overview of User Authentication
Over time, organizations and systems have means of authentication, using
voice recognition, fingerprint and iris matching, and other trusted
meanings of identification. Authentication mechanisms use any of three
qualities to confirm a user’s identity [1] [2]:
1. What the user knows. Examples of what a user may know are
passwords, PIN numbers, and pass phrases.
2. What the user has. Common examples that people have them
recognizable are keys, a driver’s license or a uniform.
3. Who the user is. The authentication methods, which are also called
biometrics, are based on a physic characteristic of the user, such as
fingerprint, the voice or the face.
Biometrics refers to technologies that are measurable physiological or
behavioral characteristics which can be used to verify the identity of an
individual.
4

Examples of physical (or physiological or biometric) characteristics
include:
• Iris
• Fingerprint (including nail)
• Hand (including knuckle, palm, vascular)
• Face
• Voice
• Retina
• DNA
• Even Odor, Earlobe, Sweat pore, Lips
Examples of mostly behavioral characteristics include:
• Signature
• Keystroke (typing pattern)
• Voice
• Gait
To compare the performance of these types of biometrics, the following
figure ranks each biometric based on seven categories as being low,
medium, or high.
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Figure 2. 1: A Comparison of Biometrics [1]

The seven categories are:
• Universality describes how commonly a biometric is found in each
individual.
• Uniqueness is how well the biometric separates one individual
from another.
• Permanence measures how well a biometric resists aging.
• Collect ability explains how easy it is to acquire a biometric for
measurement.
• Performance indicates the accuracy, speed, and robustness of the
system capturing the biometric.
• Acceptability indicates the degree of approval of a technology by
the public in everyday life.
• Circumvention is how easy it is to fool the authentication system.
As an emerging area with many opportunities for growth, there are
concerns about biometrics.

A sound trade-off between security and
6

privacy may be

necessary; collective accountability/acceptability

standards can only be enforced through common legislation. As
biometrics technology matures, there will be an increasing interaction
among the market, technology and the applications.
2.2 General principles of Biometric Systems
A biometric system is essentially a pattern recognition system that
operates by acquiring biometric data from an individual, extraction a
feature set from the acquired data, and comparing this feature set against
the template set in the database.
A biometric recognition system can run in two different modes:
identification or verification. Identification is the process of trying to find
out a person's identity by examining a biometric pattern calculated from
the person's biometric features.
In the identification case, the system is trained with the patterns of several
persons. For each of the persons, a biometric template is calculated in this
training stage. A pattern that is going to be identified is matched against
every known template, yielding either a score or a distance describing the
similarity between the pattern and the template. The system assigns the
pattern to the person with the most similar biometric template. To prevent
impostor patterns (in this case all patterns of persons not known by the
system) from being correctly identified, the similarity has to exceed a
certain level. If this level is not reached, the pattern is rejected.
In the verification case, a person's identity is claimed a priori. The pattern
that is verified only is compared with the person's individual template.
Similar to identification, it is checked whether the similarity between
7

pattern and template is sufficient to provide access to the secured system
or area.
The similarity between a pattern and a biometric template is expressed by
matching scores. The higher the score is, the higher is the similarity
between them. In theory, client scores (scores of patterns from persons
known by the system) should always be higher than the scores of
impostors. If this would be true, a single threshold, that separates the two
groups of scores, could be used to differ between clients and impostors
[3].
Depending on the choice of the classification threshold, between all and
none of the impostor patterns are falsely accepted by the system. The
threshold depending fraction of the falsely accepted patterns divided by
the number of all impostor patterns is called False Acceptance Rate
(FAR).
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Figure 2. 2: Distribution of imposter scores and False Acceptance Rate

Similarly, the genuine pattern’s scores vary around a certain mean value.
If a classification threshold that is too high is applied to the classification
scores, some of the client patterns are falsely rejected. The fraction of the
number of rejected client patterns divided by the total number of client
patterns is called False Rejection Rate (FRR).
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Figure 2. 3: Distribution of genuine scores and False Rejection Rate

If the score distributions overlap, the FAR and FRR intersect at a certain
point. The value of the FAR and the FRR at this point, which is of course
the same for both of them, is called the Equal Error Rate.
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Figure 2. 4: The overlaps of distributions and FAR&FRR

In order to reach an effective comparison of different systems, a
description independent of threshold scaling is required. One such
example from the radar technology is the Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC), which plots FRR values directly against FAR
values, thereby eliminating threshold parameters. The ROC, like the
FRR, can only take on values between 0 and 1 and is limited to values
between 0 and 1 on the x axis (FAR).
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Figure 2. 5: FAR vs. FRR ROC Curve

2.3 Machine Learning and Random Forest
Machine Learning is an area of artificial intelligence concerned with the
development of techniques which allow computers to change behavior in
a way to improve future performance. Some parts of machine learning are
closely related to data mining and statistics. Data Mining(DMM), also
called Knowledge-Discovery in Databases(KDD) or KnowledgeDiscovery and Data Ming[4], is data processing using sophisticated data
search capabilities and statistical algorithms to discover patterns and
correlations in large preexisting databases. Pattern recognition is also a
branch of artificial intelligence [5]. It is the act of taking in raw data and
taking an action based on the category of the data. These concepts were
used within our keystroke analysis study to solve the two-classification
problem (genuine, imposter).
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The main algorithm used in our study is random Forest developed by Leo
Breiman and Adele Cutler. In machine learning, a random forest is a
classifier that consists of many decision trees and outputs the class that is
the mode of the classes output by individual trees. The method combines
Breiman's "bagging" idea and Tin Kam Ho's "random subspace method"
to

construct

a

collection

of

decision

trees

with

controlled

variations[6][7][8].
Each tree is constructed using the following algorithm:
1. Let the number of training cases be N, and the number of variables
in the classifier be M.
2. We are told the number m of input variables to be used to
determine the decision at a node of the tree; m should be much less
than M.
3. Choose a training set for this tree by choosing N times with
replacement from all N available training cases. Use the rest of the
cases to estimate the error of the tree, by prediction their classes.
4. For each node of the tree, randomly choose m variables on which
to base the decision at that node. Calculate the best split based on
these m variables in the training set.
For many data sets, random forest produces a highly accurate classifier. It
has the ability to handle a very large number of input variables and it
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includes a good method for estimating missing data. Even a large
proportion of the data are missing, it maintains accuracy.
Random forest also provides an experimental way to detect variable
interactions. It computes proximities between cases, useful for clustering,
detecting outliers. The learning process in random forest is fast and it can
balance error in class population unbalanced data sets.
Nowadays, random forest is widely used in micro array literature [9]. As
it has several characteristics that make it ideal for data sets which have
many noise predictive variables and many more variables than
observations, it is also used for gene selection.
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Chapter 3 Password Authentication Mechanism and
Keystroke Dynamics
3.1 Password-Based Scheme
A big challenge for computer scientists is to protect partially shared or
private resources from unauthorized users’ accesses. The design of
efficient and secure user authentication protocols is important. Among
several suitable techniques over the years, password-based schemes are
the most common due to their simplicity.
The password-based scheme is based on what the user knows and it
seems to be secure if the user keeps his/her password a secret. However, a
password can be compromised not only when the user accidentally
discloses it, but also when the password is easy to guess.
Some attacks are referred to as dictionary attacks. Dictionary attack is a
technique for defeating an authentication mechanism by try to determine
its decryption key or pass phrase by searching through a large amount of
possibilities. As most people have a tendency to choose passwords which
are easy to remember and typically choose words taken from their native
language, dictionary attacks succeed because they try possibilities which
are most likely to be used by users.
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Brute force attack is another method to defeat a password-based scheme.
It works through all possible phrases to break the password. A theoretical
feasibility of a brute force attack is recognized, but it would be
computationally expensive to carry out. As the computation ability of
modern computers grows, brute force attack can succeed in breaking the
passwords with short lengths [10].
If a password is easy to guess, we call it weak or bad, while a hard-toguess one is called good or strong. A password is weak if it can be
guessed in a reasonable amount of time, while it is strong if the search
requires unavailable resources in terms of time or space.
Some advices for choosing a good password are:
• Use at least 8 characters.
• Include a digit or punctuation.
• Use upper and lower case.
• Choose a phrase or combination of words to make the password
easier to remember.
• Change password regularly and do not write it down.
To strengthen the security of password-based scheme, some solutions
have been proposed, for example, one-time passwords approach and
proactive password checking.

3.2 Keystroke Dynamics as a Biometric
The development of the biometric-based methods is strongly accelerated
to satisfy the requests for controlled access to data-processing resources.
16

In most cases, these biometric-based methods may be expensive to
implement. That is why we study the use of keyboard with is almost free
and available on all computers, and use keystroke dynamics as a
biometric method to enhance the reliability of password-based scheme.
Keystroke dynamics is the process of analyzing the typing patterns by
monitoring the keyboard inputs in order to identify users based on his/her
habitual typing rhythm. It has been proved that keystroke rhythm is a
good sign of identity [11][12][13].
While a user is typing a string, key-down and key-up times are captured
to drive features: duration of the key and keystroke latency. Duration of
the key is the time interval between pressing and releasing the key and
keystroke latency is the time between two keystrokes.
3.3 Related Previous Work
The first tests to differentiate people using the keystroke dynamics were
carried out by Gaines et al. in 1980[14]. They investigated the possibility
of using keystroke timings for authentication using a T-test. The T-test is
a statistical tool used to check the assumption that two populations have
the same standard deviation and average. They showed that it was
possible to differentiate users’ typing patterns. After that, many studies
conducted experiments on this subject.
3.3.1 Feature Vector Collection

Several methods were used to extract feature vectors. One method is
based on a measurement of the digraph latencies between reference
strings, such as the timing vector of dimension (2n+1) in a password with
n-characters [15]. For instance, in a password phrase “abc”, the time
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sequence vector {D1,L1,D2,L2,D3,L3,D4} contains the duration time of
each keystroke and the latency time and the duration of the enter key.

Figure 3. 1: The sequences of duration time and latency time

In [12] [16] [17], the authors used the two orthogonal components- total
time the first key is pressed (i.e. keystroke duration), and the time
between a key is released and the next key is pressed (i.e. keystroke
latency.)
The second method is a classical method in the literature and it uses
statistical data: the average and the standard deviation. A typical example
is Leggett et al. used this method to authenticate users in [18] and [19].
The characteristics are extracted from the striking of a paragraph of text.
During the creation of the profile, the average (µ) and the variance (σ2) of
each duration and latency time are calculated. Then a time o is declared
valid if it is below ½*standard deviation (σ) from the average (µ). An
observation is definitively validated if 60% of the times extracted during
striking are valid.

Other tests have been done on this method, in

particular in [20]. The tests were carried on the definition of a difficulty
degree α. So a time is considered as valid if: |t- µ | < α* σ.
Some feature sets are determined through factor analysis. Factor analysis
seeks a lower dimensional representation that accounts for the correlation
among features. This idea partitions the database of users into subsets
whose in-class members are “similar” in typing rhythm over a particular
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set of features and whose cross features are dissimilar in the
corresponding sense[21]. For example, some users exhibit strong
individualistic typing patterns for features in the set S={th, are, st, ion},
whereas some may be more distinctive over the features S={ere, on, wy}.
Some study is working in fact on discrete values associated with the
numerical values of time [22]. For example, the time is classified into 5
classes: very short, short, average, long and very long. This method need
to choose the threshold for the discretization. In a study of Sylvain
Hocquet et al. [22], they realized a fusion of these methods, and obtained
a significant improvement of performance with Z-score fusion.
3.3.2 Classification Methods

From traditional distance measurement methods to neural network
techniques, algorithms employed in related keystroke studies are quite
different. For example, Garcia [23] uses Mahalanobis distance function in
their study; Young and Hammon[24] adopt Euclidean distance; neural
Some network approaches have also been undertaken in [25],[32],[33]
and [16]. Perceptron algorithm is used by Bleha and Obaidat in [26]. In
[27], multiple machine learning algorithms were used.
3.3.3 Performance and Results

There is a relatively wide rage in performance over the two decades with
published FAR ranging from 0-8% and FRR ranging from 0-45%. There
are some commercial products on current market, such as BioPassword
patented by Young[24]. Most of the studies improved the mechanism and
performance of keystroke dynamic systems.
3.3.4 Typical Problems
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The common problems that exist in the literature are:
1. The input target string cannot represent the user’s typing
pattern.
2. The number of samples is too small to obtain a good
performance.
3. Feature vector sets chosen for identification purposes impose
limitations on what can be achieved in the test.
4. Even the most efficient algorithms and classifiers have biases
on the dataset.
3.4 Bartlow-Cukic Algorithm
3.4.1 Experimental Design and Data Collection

In the WVU experiment [28], each user was given two sets of
username/password credential sequences. The username is of the form
Firstname.Lastname with the first latter of each name capitalized. The
first password was an eight letter lowercase English word taken from a
cryptographic dictionary attack list, such as computer and swimming.
The second password consisted of 12 random characters in a consistent
pattern. The format of the pattern is:
SUUDLLLLDUUS
Where S is a special symbol, U is an uppercase letter, L is a lowercase
letter and D is a digit. Examples of such passwords include +JI5ftr8REand ^DE2kum4WH?.
For each sequence, key hold times and inter-key delays are collected in
both the username and password. After some calculation, the following
attributes were used to from a feature vector, as seen in Table 4.1.
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Table 3. 1: Feature Vector Collected for Each Input Sequence

The final database had a total of 53 users with 10,000 total input
sequences. The demographics of the database represent a fairly diverse
population. The gender split was approximately half and half, ages ranged
from mid-teens to individuals in their early 60’s. The typing ability of the
population was also very diverse, ranging from typing beginners to
individuals with professional keystroke experience.
3.4.2 Algorithmic Approach

The previous research demonstrated that Random Forests are superior in
terms of overall performance, FAR, and FRR for the datasets tests than
OneR, NaiveBayes, VotedPerceptron, LogitBoost and C5.0.
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Figure 3. 2: Overall System Performance ROC Curve

Random Forests is an algorithm that constructs a set of decision trees
randomly generated from a subset of the attributes in a feature vector.
After construction of the forest of decision trees, a vote is taken across all
individual trees to determine the class of a given input sequence.
3.4.3 Results and Conclusions

The system is capable of operating at various points on a traditional ROC
curve depending on application specific security needs. A 1% False
Accept Rate is attainable at a 14% False Reject Rate. An Equal Error
Rate of 5% is suitable for systems requiring a relatively low security. As
a username/password authentication scheme, the approach decreases the
system penetration rate associated with compromised passwords by 95%99%.
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The results show that complex password sequences involving shift-key
behavior offer a noticeable improvement in performance (classification
accuracy, FAR and EER) over short password sequences that do not
require the extensive use of the shift keys.
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Chapter 4 Incremental Study

In [28], authors have demonstrated the performance of keystroke
dynamics classification, proving that keystroke dynamics can be applied
as an effective credential hardening mechanism. Unfortunately, the notion
of personalization in user habituation brings issues caused by the
diversity of typing abilities across different users, which range from the
“hunt and peck” typists to individuals with professional training
experience. It is imperative that we study the impact of such diversity
over the keystroke dynamics. Furthermore, considering the evolving
nature of the keystroke patterns over time, we designed an study on user
habituation process and analyzed the data collected from the process.

4.1 User Habituation
As the passwords in our experiment are chosen by the computer, not
every user was familiar with the typing sequences and had a smooth,
quick and accurate typing style when they started using this system. Most
beginners often hesitate between keystrokes and have to think about
which key to press. However, while they were getting more and more
familiar with their typing sequences, they were developing their typing
skills and forming their unique typing patterns. Forming a unique typing
pattern is a non-associative learning process. User might be unconscious
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about his/her typing habit, but the underlying habituation occurs during
the training process.
One concern is how long the process of creating a typing habit takes. In
WVU experiment [28], we asked our users to practice the password 5-10
times before using the system. However, many, if not all users admitted
to having neglected this instruction. Assuming most individuals were
fairly familiar with typing their username, the collected trails should
indicate the password acclimation process.

With the algorithm and datasets in Section 3.4, we are able to conduct the
experiments with differing sizes of training sets. In the training sets, the
number of genuine and imposter sequences is respectively increased from
6 to 30.

The test set was defined from the remaining genuine and

imposter sequences beyond the first 30. Using this system, the average
test size was 58 and 59 sequences for short and long passwords
respectively.
Our experiments were carried out using the Random Forest algorithm [8].
We attained the equal error rate for each user (30 users for long
sequences and 33 users for short sequences), and then calculated the
average equal error rates with differing number of samples in the training
sets.
The average equal error rates across all users are listed in Table 4.1. The
errors for most long passwords datasets turn out to be lower than those of
short passwords by approximately 3%. On average, the long password
sets produced 3.56% fewer errors than the short passwords set.
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Average EER

Number of Training
Sequences

Short

Long

Short-Long

6
9
12
15
18
21
24
27
30

0.135227
0.14875
0.121086
0.101546
0.092074
0.085551
0.084637
0.074278
0.07037

0.126579
0.087469
0.078887
0.06745
0.055666
0.052098
0.042157
0.037469
0.036888

0.00864765
0.06128095
0.04219854
0.03409582
0.03640771
0.03345294
0.04248027
0.03680865
0.03348222

Total Average

0.101502 0.064963 0.03653942

Table 4. 1: The average equal error rate (EER) of experiments with differing numbers
of training sequences.
(The columns denoted as ‘short’ and ‘long’, respectively, indicate datasets trained
with short passwords and long passwords. The column denoted as ‘Short-long’
indicates the difference in value of average EER between short passwords and long
passwords.)

Figure 4.1 shows the influence of the number of training sequences used
in the experiments. The two lines in Figure 4.1 represent the average
EER’s across all users who have entered a sufficient number of genuine
and imposter sequences. As mentioned before, the training set was
incrementally increased as seen on the x-axis in the figure (6, 9, 12, 15,
etc…).
The average equal error rate drops significantly as the amount of training
sequences increases. The maximum value of errors for short passwords is
14.9% when 9 sequences are used in the training set, while a 7.0% EER is
achieved as the number of training sequences is increased to 30. For long
password, the EER decreases from 12.7% to 3.7%.
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Average EER vs. Number of Training sequences
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Figure 4. 1: User Habituation:
EER’s achieved by incrementally training the Random Forests classification
algorithm with password typing sequences

The following four box plots represent the distribution of equal error
rates for each dataset.
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EER vs Number of Training Sequences
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Figure 4. 2: Boxplot of EER vs. Number of Training Sequences for Short Passwords

As shown in Figure 4.2, in the short passwords datasets, these boxes have
fairly similar median values. In each dataset, around half of the equal
error rates are greater than 7%. The inter-quartile range (IQR) is
decreasing as the number of training sequences increases, indicating
reduced variability of equal error rates. In addition, the maximum values
of equal error rates are closer to the median in the later periods, and each
dataset has a minimum error rate of zero. This boxplot shows that the
more the training sequences, the better the performance, but as the upper
quartile decreases from one period to the next, the lower quartile has a
limit value of 2%.

28

EER vs Number of Training Sequences
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Figure 4. 3: Boxplot of EER vs. Number of Training Sequences for Long Passwords

Figure 4.3 shows the boxplots representing the long passwords dataset.
Both the median value and the inter-quartile range are decreasing
significantly as the size of training set increases. Each experiment has a
minimum error rate of zero. Almost half of users (14 out of 30) have
achieved an EER of 0% and all the EER’s are less than 20% after the first
27 sequences are included into the training process.

4.2 Performance Prediction
To forecast the performance of the system, we add trend lines to the chart
in Figure 4.1. As we can see in Figures 4.4 and 4.5, for long password,
the trend line function is
y = 0.1325 x −0.5719 ,

(1)

and for short password, the trend line function is

29

y = 0.1597 x −0.3405 ,

(2)

where y is the equal error rate and x is the number of training typing
sequences.
EER vs Number of Training Sequences
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Figure 4. 4: Trendline of EER (Long Password)
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Figure 4. 5 Trendline of EER (Short Password)
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Figure 4.6 shows the ROC curves for long password using different
number of training sequences. The more training sequences used, the
better the performance of keystroke dynamics authentication.
ROC curve(Long Passw ord)
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Figure 4. 6 ROC curves using different training sequences

Based on the false accept rates of the systems using increasingly long
training sequences, we also generated the trendline(Figure 4.7) of FAR
with a fixed FRR=0.01. The trendline function is
y = 0.5253 x −0.7387 ,

(3)

where y is the false accept rate and x is the number of training sequences.
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FAR vs Number of Training Sequences
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Figure 4. 7 Trendline of FAR(Long Password, FRR=0.01)

4.3 Discussion
In order to better understand the habituation process for keystroke
dynamics classification, we conducted a chronologically incremental
study and investigated the difference in performance between the eightletter lowercase English passwords and the twelve-character randomly
generated passwords which require shift-key behavior. Experimental
results show that the performance obtained from the long and complex
password sequences is dominating that from the short and simple
password sequences.
What also should be noted is the trend of the decreasing error rate when
more sequences are added into the training process. This provides an
insightful perception of the habituation in keystroke dynamics. The
habituation results give us confidence in the feasibility of deploying a
practical and unsupervised keystroke dynamics system. Our study
suggests that a user should choose a number of keystroke dynamics
training sequences based on his/her application security specific needs.
Moreover, we observed that with long shift-key passwords, the EER rates
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begin to approach acceptable levels after only 10 sequences, which
indicates a fairly robust password protection performance. However, an
arguably low level of user-friendliness associated with long shift-key
passwords definitely impedes their adoption in real-world applications.
This motivates us in investigating further the security requirements and
design for password-based authentication schemes and exploring new
approaches to achieving high level security by leveraging the superior
performance of keystroke dynamics with long and complex passwords.
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Chapter 5 The Two Passwords Authentication Scheme

In this chapter, we investigate the password hardness measured by the
probability of a password being cracked through guessing attacks of
existing single password mechanisms. The trade-off between user’s
ability for memorizing the passwords and password security has become
an inevitable dilemma for single password authentication systems. Based
on our findings, we propose a novel two password mechanism to
strengthen the password hardness.
5.1 Password Hardness
Password hardness is commonly used as a measurement of password
security. In general, hardness can be viewed as the ability of a password
to withstand the attacks, which mainly take the form of “repeated
guessing”. Thus, in the context of this study, we measure the password
hardness by computing the password guessing attack metric in the form
of a probability.
5.1.1. Probability of a Password Being Guessed (P)

According to U.S. Department of Defense password management
guideline [29], the probability of a password being guessed can be
estimated and managed by the following equation:
P=

LR
,
S
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(4)

where L is the maximum password lifetime, R is the login attempt rate, S
is the size of the password space, and P is the probability that a password
can be guessed through guessing attacks in its lifetime.
5.1.2. Password Space (S)

Password length and alphabet size are factors in computing the maximum
password space requirement. The following equation expresses the size of
the password space:
S = AM ,

(5)

where:
S = password space;
A = number of alphabet symbols;
M = password length.
From equation (4), we can see that as the lifetime of password increases,
the probability of a password being guessed increases.
5.1.3. Password Login Attempt Rate (R)

The password login attempt rate is estimated as the number of attacks per
time unit (e.g. per month or per second) to a password during its lifetime.
It is also named as the “password guessing rate”. Various data has been
disclosed in slightly different forms measuring the login attempt rate. In
1988, Clifford Stoll uncovered a hacker using a dictionary attack on
encrypted passwords, and estimated time to crack with common hardware
was one month. In 2000, Paul Bobby published “Password Cracking
Using Focused Dictionaries”, achieving 48,000 guesses per second, while
dictionary attacks only take seconds and full eight characters cracking
needs 4765 years. In 2005, a G5 running at 2.7 GHz with a highly
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optimized copy of John The Ripper hit 900,000 guesses per second and
full eight characters cracking in this case take 200 years [30].
The magnitude of the password guessing rate is appalling. In order to
avoid brute force attack [10], which is the most common and effective
form of password guessing attacks, we can set limits on the number of
login or other attempts before terminating the connection or process to
control the guessing rate, as suggested in the password management
guidelines by U.S. Department of Defense [29]. Thus, some password
authentication procedures are intentionally made slow for the sake of
forcefully decreasing the login attempt rate, given the fact that a
legitimate user would rarely complain if the login process takes a slightly
longer time, normally 1 to 2 seconds.
5.1.4. Password lifetime (L)

The greater the length of time during which a password is used for
authentication purposes, the more opportunities exist for exposing it. In a
useful password system, the probability of compromise of a password
increases during its lifetime. The longer the same password is in use, the
greater the likelihood that someone gets to know it or can guess it. For an
initial period of time, this probability could be considered acceptably low.
After a longer period of time, it would be considered unacceptably high.
At the latter point, use of the old password should be considered suspect
rather than a reliable proof of identity. By appropriately limiting the
length of time during which a password can be used, the vulnerability of
the password can remain acceptable. To protect against unknown threats,
the U.S. Department of Defense recommends that the maximum lifetime
of a password be no greater than 1 year.
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Changing the password frequently adds another layer of security. In many
computer systems, as part of the effort to improve computer security, it is
required that a user should always change his/her password timely and
periodically.
5.2 The Trade-off Dilemma
In general, the hardness of a password can be improved by increasing the
complexity of the password and lengthening the password. However, the
increasing complexity and length of passwords raises issues in password
acceptance and user experience. Figure 5.1 illustrates the trade-off
between the user experience and password security. Nowadays, as the
security requirements on passwords become more and more demanding,
the state of the art “hard” password would require a user to provide a
password with no less than eight characters and a combination of capital
cases, symbols, numbers, non-dictionary words, etc, all of which seems
almost as complex as a randomly generated password. Yet at the same
time, many users would admit that typing in such a password is as much a
nuisance as creating one.

Figure 5. 1Trade-off between user experience and password security
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Statistical studies also confirm the dilemma point. “Soft” passwords come
with significant vulnerability and “hard” passwords come with a price in
user experience. In his report [31], Daniel V. Klein gathered 25,000 Unix
passwords, and found that 21 to 25 percent of password could be guessed,
depending on the amount of effort put in [31]. Dictionary words
accounted for 7.4 percent, common names for 4 percent, combinations of
user and account name 2.7 percent, and so on down a list of less-probable
choices such as words from science fiction (0.4 percent) and sports terms
(0.2 percent). It seems that many users did not put much effort to create a
reliable password. People have trouble remembering arbitrary digits and
keystrokes, so they are willing to choose a password which is easy to
remember and yet which is, in a sense, easy to be guessed by dictionary
attack or brute force attack.
Some experts believe that we can improve security by restricting the
password people can use. For example, use an automatic password
generator to produce random passwords. Our results also show that the
keystroke dynamics classification using short and simple passwords is not
as effective as that using long and complex passwords. Therefore, we
would prefer to use the password that at consists of 12 randomly
generated characters. Unfortunately, such passwords will be extremely
challenging for most users to memorize. Users might be compelled to
write the password down in order to help themselves to remember it,
whereby giving the attackers opportunities to physically steal the
password. It is evident that with the single password mechanism, the
trade-off dilemma is unavoidable.

5.3 Two Passwords Mechanism
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Where single password mechanism fails, we find that two-password
mechanism can succeed. We propose a two password mechanism system
to take advantages of both simple and complex passwords, i.e. simple and
short password is more user-friendly and complex and long password
provides better security. Figure 5.2 depicts the two passwords
mechanism.
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Figure 5. 2: Two Passwords Mechanism

As shown in the block diagram of the overall system in Figure 5.2, we
propose two stages of user authentication. Stage one uses the traditional
username/password scheme. Users login with their username and the first
password, namely Password 1. After the user passes the first stage, the
system will then provide a long sequence which contains upper and lower
case characters and random symbols, called Password 2. The user types it
and the key-up and key-down time is recorded. The system will use the
data to analyze the user’s keystroke dynamics behavior for verification.
This completes the second stage of the two passwords mechanism.
The first stage is based on commonly used username/password scheme.
The password is generated by users themselves when a new account is
created. As mentioned in Section 5.2, the user-generated password is
usually not very secure. The longer this password is used, the higher
probability it will be cracked by guessing. Thus, it needs to be replaced
when the probability of being cracked reaches the security lever. Figure
5.3 depicts the typical relationship between a password replacement
policy and the probability of password cracking.

Figure 5. 3: Password replacement policy
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In the second stage, the system would provide the user a long password,
similar to the ones we used to test the user’s keystroke behavior. To
utilize keystroke dynamics effectively, this password would be set and
changed less frequently. In Chapter 4, we demonstrated that the false
accept rate of keystroke dynamic classification decreases as the users type
the same password over and over again, as shown in Figure 5.4.

Figure 5. 4: False Accept Rate VS Lifetime of Password 2

In the proposed two-password authentication scheme, the probability of
passing both verifications by an impostor depends on the probability of
Password 1 being guessed and the false accept rate of keystroke analysis
in Password 2. We can mathematically formulate this relationship as
follows.
Prob (Impostors login) = Prob (Password 1 being guessed) * FAR
Due to its user friendliness, Password 1 might be changed frequently.
Thus, a meaningful keystroke dynamics pattern would be hard to obtain
from Password 1. In the light of this, users would need to type the first
several sequences of Password 2 as keystroke training set, till FAR
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reaches the desired security level. The steps to establish a reliable user
habituation are as following.
1. To create a new account, the user generates his/her username and
Password 1. Password 2 is provided by the system. Every time the
user logins into the system, he/she is asked to enter username and
Password 1 for verification. The keystroke information of typing
Password 2 is collected by the system as model training.
2. After the system collects enough training data, the keystroke
analysis verification process is turned on. Only the correct
keystroke patterns will be accepted. Once the system finds any
suspicious activity that tries to crack Password 2, it immediately
locks the account and informs the genuine user to change Password
1. For better security, the new Password 2 is also prompted to the
user.

Afterwards,

the

system continues

its

learning and

classification process using new data collected over the new
Password 2.
3. To further reduce the probability of being guessed, it is required
that Password 1 be changed once the probability of being guessed
reaches a certain threshold value. This probability calculation
would be continually updated by the system and it would guide
Password 1 replacement process.
The model which indicates the authentication system resilience using
the two-password scheme is shown in Figure 5.5.
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Figure 5. 5: Probability of the overall system being cracked

5.4 Experiments
Assume that most users would prefer to use short password which consist
of 8 lower case letters as Password 1. The space of this password is then
268 . Furthermore, assuming the password attacking rate is 1 attack per

second, i.e. 3600*24 attacks per day, according to equation (4), the
probability of this password being guessed can be computed as
P1 =

LR 3600 × 24
=
L.
S
268

where:
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(6)

P1 = Probability of Password 1 being cracked;

L = Lifetime of Password 1(or existed time);
S = Password space;
R= Password attacking rate (1 attack per second).
Now suppose the user changes his/her password once per year. We
compute P1 using this frequency and then obtain the trend of P1 over
time as shown in Figure 5.6.
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Figure 5. 6: Probability of being guessed vs. password lifetime (Password 1)

At the same time, let us assume the user types the long password,
Password 2, once a day to let the system collect the keystroke
information. From Chapter 5, we know the trend function of False Accept
Rate of the long password is P2 = 0.5435( L × r )−0.7798 = 0.5435 L−0.7798 (7)
where:
P2 = Probability of Password 2 being cracked;

L= Lifetime of Password 2(or time since being generated);
r = The typing rate of Password 2(one time per day).

This trend function is depicted in Figure 5.7.
44

Password 2

False Accept Rate

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0

60

120

180

240

300

360

420

480

540

600

660 720
Time(day)

Figure 5. 7 FAR vs Password Lifetime (Password 2)

Thus, the probability of cracking the overall system is
P = P1 × P2 =

3600 * 24
L × 0.5435 L−0.7798 ,
8
26

(8)

Figure 5.8 shows the trend of P over time.
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Figure 5. 8 Trendline of the probability of being cracked in the overall system
(Password 1 + Password 2)
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Based on this example, we can see that when a new user enrolls into the
system, Password 2 that incorporates keystroke dynamics analysis might
be vulnerable to attacks due to the acclimation process of user
habituation. However, at this point of time, Password 1 is difficult to
crack, which ensures the security of the system and protects Password 2
from attacks. Later on, although the probability of Password 1 being
cracked would increase over time, the performance of the keystroke
dynamic system reaches a relatively high security level and the hardness
of Password 2 would be reinforced through continuous learning. This
way, Password 1 and Password 2 complement each other, and a balance
between user experience and password security is thus achieved by the
two-password mechanism.
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Chapter 6 Conclusions and Future Work

The increasingly high level of security demanded from password based
user authentication systems aggravates the challenge of password
protection. There is a wide agreement that increasing the complexity and
length of a password will harden a password yet not necessarily be
effective enough to survive attacks such as shoulder surfing, Trojan
horses, and viruses. Keystroke dynamics has been proposed in previous
studies to leverage user’s typing patterns to fortify password security. As
a promising biometric technology, keystroke dynamics provides an
advanced layer of personalized security that has been proven to be able to
successfully defeat many attacks, which conventional password
protection mechanisms fail to vanquish.
The key to a reliable keystroke dynamic system is the user’s habituation.
An in-depth analysis of users’ typing patterns as well as the forming
process of such patterns are crucial to the performance of the keystroke
dynamics based classifier that is built upon these patterns. We therefore
designed a study analyze the typing habituation process. Based on the
results obtained from this study, we investigated an extension of
conventional single password mechanism. In an attempt to solve the
trade-off dilemma between user experience and password security, we
proposed a novel two passwords mechanism for advanced password
protection incorporating keystroke dynamics.
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The conclusions we draw from our study follow below.
6.1 Conclusions
We obtained the results of varying training set sizes over a wide range for
two different types of passwords from our empirical study of habituation
process, we used short and simple 8 letter words and long and complex
12 characters random phrases as pass phrases. The algorithm we used for
classification is Breiman’s Random Forest[8], which has demonstrated
superior performance for keystroke dynamics classifications [28].
We first identified the impact of varying the training set size on the
classification error rate. The equal error rate drops as we increase the
amount of training data. Comparing the trend of error rates, the long
password sequences performed significantly better across numerous tests
with different training set sizes. This supports our conclusions that, 1)
long and complex passwords are more effective when employed in
keystroke dynamics systems; and 2) there is a habituation and acclimation
process needed for the user to obtain a stable keystroke pattern.
Based on the insights we gained from the keystroke dynamics user
habituation study, we proposed a two passwords mechanism that first
adopts an easy-to-memorize password for password verification, followed
by a fixed long and complex phrase that utilizes the features of the user’s
keystroke patterns for classification. The proposed mechanism attempts
to improve password security without sacrificing much of user
experience. Our analysis shows that the deployment of keystroke
dynamics in this system should significantly decrease the probability of
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authentication break-down. Experiments demonstrate that, with proper
keystroke

dynamics

design,

the

two-password

mechanism

can

significantly improve the usual login-password authentication.

6.2 Future Work
By its very nature, keystroke dynamics is less costly than other biometrics
and can take place in a remote access point. The improvement of both
performance and user experience in keystroke dynamics based password
authentication offers a great opportunity to its wide adoption in realworld applications. We envision future improvements to be made in the
following aspects.
Number of Samples: The number of samples collected in our experiment
varies greatly. Some users did not provide sufficient samples to establish
a reliable classification template. This can be problematic when the
sample size is relatively small. In the future, we plan to address this issue
by increasing our user population and the number of samples of each
user.
Features: The features used in our experiment are mainly based on
statistical data, such as the average time of key intervals and latency. The
sequences of latency time and duration time of each string can also be
considered as feature vectors in future work.
Mechanism: An adaptation mechanism could be performed to maintain
and improve keystroke matching. Every time a successful authentication

49

is performed, we could replace the oldest samples from the training
dataset with the newly obtained ones and rebuild the classification model.
Algorithm: It is well known that every algorithm has it bias. We envision
to design and develop a hybrid approach or a combination of algorithms
to avoid the bias problem and improve the classification performance. In
a preliminary study, we developed a fusion model by combining different
algorithms. The following is an example of the fusion model for one user.
The algorithms used are Random Forest and Naïve Bayes with two
different feature selection methods: Consistency Subset Evaluation and
Correlation-based Feature Selection. From Figure 6.1, we can see the
ROC curve of the 2 out of 3 decision level fusion system is significantly
better than that of each single algorithm.

Figure 6. 1: An Example of Decision Level Fusion
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